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Based on the instrumental account of emotion regulation (Tamir, 2005), the current research seeks to offer a
novel perspective to the emotions–creativity debate by investigating the instrumental value of trait-consistent
emotions in creativity. We hypothesize that emotions such as worry (vs. happy) are trait-consistent experi-
ences for individuals higher on trait neuroticism and experiencing these emotions can facilitate performance
in a creativity task. In 3 studies, we found support for our hypothesis. First, individuals higher in neuroticism
had a greater preference for recalling worrisome (vs. happy) events in anticipation of performing a creativity
task (Study 1). Moreover, when induced to recall a worrisome (vs. happy) event, individuals higher in
neuroticism came up with more creative design (Study 2) and more flexible uses of a brick (Study 3) when
the task was a cognitively demanding one. Further, Study 3 offers preliminary support that increased intrinsic
task enjoyment and motivation mediates the relationship between trait-consistent emotion regulation and
creative performance. These findings offer a new perspective to the controversy concerning the emotions–
creativity relationship and further demonstrate the role of instrumental emotion regulation in the domain of
creative performance.
Keywords: instrumental emotion regulation, creativity, neuroticism, emotions
Although the relationship between emotions and creativity has
been extensively theorized and researched (e.g., Baas, De Dreu, &
Nijstad, 2008; Forgas & George, 2001), it is still unclear which
emotional state would benefit individual creativity most (Amabile,
1996a; Vosburg & Kaufmann, 1999). Whereas some studies showed
that positive versus neutral moods facilitate cognitive complexity and
creative problem solving across a broad range of settings (see Ashby,
Isen, & Turken, 1999 for a review), others showed that negative
moods (vs. positive or neutral moods) foster creative performance
(e.g., Adaman & Blaney, 1995; Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000;
Clapham, 2001; Gasper, 2003).
Creativity has often been identified as the process of generating
something both novel and useful (Amabile, 1996a). Given creativity’s
central role in human culture, previous research has amassed a huge
body of empirical knowledge to discern the various determinants of
creativity. Among one of the most researched factors is the role of
emotions in creativity. Results from a recent meta-analysis of 63
empirical studies (Davis, 2009) support a contextual perspective to the
emotions–creativity relationship (see also Martin & Stoner, 1996).
There is general support for the facilitating effect of positive emotions
on creativity. In contrast, the evidence for the creative benefits of
negative emotions is mixed. Overall, the meta-analysis suggests that
the moderating effects of negative emotions and even positive emo-
tions on creativity are context dependent.
The feelings-as-information model provides an example that
demonstrates the contextual perspective to the emotions–creativity
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link. The key premise of this model is that moods provide people
important information (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994;
Schwarz & Clore, 1988) and that the informational influence of
current mood states is context dependent (Martin & Stoner, 1996).
To the extent that moods provide people with information, a
positive mood state may signal doing well on the creativity task
and no further efforts are needed, thus potentially hampering
creativity; conversely, a negative mood state may signal inade-
quate performance on the task and further efforts are needed, thus
subsequently raising creativity (George & Zhou, 2002; Zhou &
George, 2001). Interestingly, researchers also found that this
feelings-as-information effect can be modulated by how the task is
framed or construed (Friedman, Fo˝rster, & Denzler, 2007). In a set
of studies, when some creative generation tasks were framed as fun
and silly, participants who were induced to feel positively per-
formed better than when the same tasks were framed as serious and
important. The reverse was true for the participants who were
induced to feel negatively, so that they were more creative when
the tasks were framed as serious and important (vs. fun and silly).
These findings suggest that the emotions–creativity relation is a
complex one that is largely dependent on the contextual construal
of the task. As a result, creativity increases when the motivational
inclination elicited by a given mood state (e.g., positive moods
signaling safety and stimulation seeking) is compatible with the
nature of task construal (e.g., fun).
Previous research has largely supported the contextual view as
a useful framework to account for the emotions–creativity relation
(Davis, 2009; George & Zhou, 2002, 2007). As such, the contex-
tual perspective suggests that negative emotions might benefit
creativity in certain situations (e.g., Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad,
2011, 2012 works on how fear and uncertainty relate to creativity).
For example, one recent research revealed that when the negative
emotion of fear signals an unfulfilled prevention-focused state, this
would lead individuals to generate as many original ideas and
creative insights as under a promotion-focused state (Baas et al.,
2011). In the current research, we present an alternative account to
the contextual perspective by drawing on novel insights from the
theoretical framework of instrumental emotion regulation (Tamir,
2009a; Tamir, 2011) in order to resolve the seemingly inconsistent
findings pertaining to the link between negative emotions and
creativity. Thus, adding to the contextual approach, we submit that
the mixed results for negative emotions ensue from another pos-
sibility that negative emotions benefit individuals with certain
personality dispositions only. In this light, we investigate how
trait-consistent emotion regulation helps individuals attain higher
creative performance.
According to the instrumental account of emotion regulation,
experiences with trait-consistent emotions foster attainment of
performance goals (Tamir, 2005, 2009b). Recognizing the instru-
mental benefits of trait-consistent emotions implies that emotion
regulation is not always aimed at pleasure seeking. People can be
motivated to attain positive outcomes for satisfying an instrumen-
tal motive rather than positive feelings for satisfying a hedonic
motive. Therefore, when negative emotional experiences are in-
strumental for goal pursuit, individuals may be motivated to seek
out these negative emotional experiences for the sake of goal
attainment. For example, for the trait of neuroticism, individuals
higher on this trait have a greater preference for worry- (vs.
happiness-) enhancing activities before engaging in an effortful
task (Tamir, 2005). As research on approach and avoidance mo-
tivational orientation suggests, emotions such as anxiety and worry
are some trait-consistent emotions for individuals higher in neu-
roticism (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Carver, Sutton, & Scheier,
2000; Higgins, 1987). To elaborate, prior work has linked trait
neuroticism with an avoidance system that prioritizes the motiva-
tion to prevent negative outcomes from happening. This avoidance
motivation goes hand in hand with feelings of worry and anxiety,
as individuals would feel worried and anxious in their anticipation
or actual experience of negative outcomes. Such synchronization
between the personality disposition and the often experienced
affective state provides a strong motivational cue that effectively
facilitates attainment of desired outcomes in a performance con-
text. In addition, following the logic that trait-consistent affect
regulation serves the functional goal of expending adequate effort
for attaining high performance on a task, the instrumental benefit
of trait-consistent affect was found to be more prevalent in cog-
nitively demanding tasks, for these tasks require higher efforts to
optimize performance (Tamir, 2005).
Drawing from this novel insight, the current research seeks to
achieve four goals. First, applying the perspective of instrumental
emotion regulation to the creative performance context, individu-
als higher in neuroticism who are in a worrisome (vs. happy)
affective state will perform more creatively particularly when the
creativity task is a cognitively demanding one. If confirmed, this
finding will offer an alternative account to the contextual view of
the emotions–creativity relationship (Davis, 2009) by recognizing
the creative benefits produced by the congruence between individ-
uals’ trait disposition and their experienced emotional state. Es-
sentially, we predict that negative emotions can improve creative
performance mainly for individuals who have dispositional pref-
erences for experiencing negative emotions before engaging in a
challenging creativity task. Furthermore, this will show that the
relationship between emotional states and creativity is not fixed.
Instead, the same emotional state, regardless of its valence, can
promote or retard performance depending on whether it is congru-
ent with one’s traits. To our knowledge, applying the theoretical
perspective of instrumental emotion regulation to understanding
the emotions–creativity link has never been explored in the vast
literatures on emotions and creativity.
Second, the current research attempts to offer novel conceptual
extension of the instrumental framework of emotion regulation by
showing whether trait-consistent emotional experiences improve
performance on tasks that require creative thinking. Prior re-
search has found impressive evidence for the instrumental ben-
efits of trait-consistent emotional experiences to performance
on demanding cognitive tasks (Tamir, 2009b). Creativity as a
performance domain is very different from other previously
studied performance-related tasks in the instrumental emotion
regulation literature (e.g., anagram task, preparation for a speech).
For example, as compared with the anagram task, performing well
in a creativity task requires more complex cognitive processing in
order to create something both novel and useful (Amabile, 1996a).
Given that no right or wrong answer is specified in creative idea
generations as opposed to the presence of a correct answer to
anagrams, it is reasonable to argue that completing an idea gen-
eration task demands much higher levels of cognitively flexibility
to break set and persistence to prolong effort from the part of the
individuals in order to excel in the task (see De Dreu, Baas, &
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2 LEUNG, LIOU, QIU, KWAN, CHIU, AND YONG
Nijstad, 2008 for a discussion on the dual pathway to creative
performance). Besides the requirement of higher levels of cogni-
tive processing, individuals engaging in a creativity task might be
largely uncertain about their performance level even upon task
completion. Whereas the performance level in an anagram task can
be easily assessed and monitored by the individuals themselves,
performance level in a creativity task is often not immediately
accessible to the individuals. Their creative output has to await
evaluations, with high performance requiring a certain degree of
recognition by others or sufficient deviations from some normative
standards. Therefore, it is theoretically interesting to examine if
individuals will also engage in emotion regulation for instrumental
reasons even when pursuing the performance task requires more
complex and higher order cognitive processing, yet highly uncer-
tain whether efforts can eventually be paid off. We believe that the
current research is important because it sets out to challenge the
theoretical boundary of the instrumental emotion regulation frame-
work with a performance task that is of a different nature than
those previously examined.
Third, whereas the past literature has shown robust findings
regarding individuals’ motivated affect regulation to choose to
recall happy or worried events for possibly reaping instrumental
benefits in an anticipated task, direct evidence on the instrumental
benefits of actual performance outcome is relatively scant. To our
knowledge, the benefit of instrumental emotion regulation on
actual performance outcome was mainly examined with a cogni-
tively demanding anagram task (Tamir, 2005, Study 4). It is
therefore important to gather further evidence of whether instru-
mental emotion regulation impacts actual performance (vs. simply
giving an expectation to perform in a task). Essentially, to shed
novel insight to the literature on the moods-creativity link, it is
critical to replicate the result with creativity tasks in order to
observe the effects of different mood states on actual performance
of individual creativity.
Fourth, aside from illustrating the applicability of the instrumen-
tal view of emotion regulation in the domain of creative perfor-
mance, the current research seeks to understand the underlying
psychological mechanism of the effect of trait-consistent emotion
regulation on creativity. We posit that trait-consistent emotion
regulation facilitates creative performance by increasing intrinsic
task motivation, which may also explain other instrumental bene-
fits of emotion regulation besides creativity. Past research has
shown that a match between chronic personal preferences (e.g.,
orientations to approach or avoid) and evoked or task-induced
states (e.g., happiness or anxiety) elicits the phenomenology of
feeling right, which in turn motivates optimization of goal-pursuit
strategies, and increases persistence and performance (Fulmer et
al., 2010; Higgins, 1987; Higgins, 2000). The facilitation effect of
the match between personal preferences and task-induced states
can be attributed to an increase in intrinsic task enjoyment
(Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Shah & Krug-
lanski, 2000). In three studies, Freitas and Higgins (2002)
showed that accomplishment-oriented individuals intrinsically
enjoy eagerness-related actions more, whereas responsibility-
oriented individuals intrinsically enjoy vigilance-related actions
more. Regarding regulatory fit in the context of personality traits
and goal pursuit strategies, one research showed that people higher
in trait openness to experience are more motivated to pursue their
hopes, aspirations, and goals framed in gain attainment, but less
motivated to pursue their duties, obligations, and goals framed in
loss avoidance (Vaughn, Baumann, & Klemann, 2008). This result
demonstrates the motivating effect of regulatory fit between high
openness and promotion (vs. prevention) focused strategy.
Besides research support for increased intrinsic motivation fol-
lowing a match between personal disposition and the experienced
emotion state, evidence has shown that intrinsic motivation is
highly conducive to creativity. Highly intrinsically motivated in-
dividuals are more deeply involved in the task and engage their
creativity-relevant skills for attaining high creative performance
(Amabile, 1996b). Relatedly, research suggested that individuals
with a learning goal orientation, which is associated with high
intrinsic motivation for increasing task competence, prefer solving
challenging tasks with unconventional approaches (Vandewalle,
1997). Essentially, strong intrinsic interests are important for un-
dertaking and excelling in a creativity task. Hence, consistent with
the notion of regulatory fit, we hypothesize that for individuals
with chronic tendencies to show high neuroticism, experiencing
worrisome affective state can evoke a similar phenomenology of
feeling right, which is manifest in increased intrinsic motivation
and task enjoyment, leading to improved performance in demand-
ing creativity tasks.
Overview of Studies
We sought to provide evidence for our hypotheses in three
studies. In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that individuals higher
in neuroticism would prefer recalling worrisome (vs. happy)
events in anticipation of performing an effortful creativity task. In
Studies 2 and 3, we sought to show that when induced to recall a
worrisome (vs. happy) event, individuals higher in neuroticism
would generate more creative designs in a challenging idea gen-
eration task (Study 2) and generate more unusual uses of a com-
mon object under high cognitive load (Study 3).
We designed these three studies to achieve our research goals
and to garner convergent evidence for our hypotheses in four ways.
First, whereas Study 1 attempted to demonstrate that individuals
higher in neuroticism would display stronger preferences for ex-
periencing worry-related events prior to performing a creativity
task, Studies 2 and 3 sought to show that the actual experience with
worry-related events would actually enhance creative perfor-
mance. Second, to assess the effect of experiencing trait-congruent
affect on performance in cognitively demanding tasks, we used
relatively effortful creative performance tasks in Studies 1 and 2.
To provide further evidence that the creative benefits of experi-
encing trait-congruent affect would be particularly pronounced in
a demanding task context, in Study 3 we experimentally manipu-
lated the participants’ cognitive load while performing the creativ-
ity task, using the procedure introduced by Macrae, Hewstone, and
Griffiths (1993). Specifically, participants were required to re-
hearse either a two-digit (low load) or eight-digit (high load)
number at the same time they engaged in the creativity task. Third,
to provide convergent evidence for our hypotheses, we measured
participants’ creative performance with (a) peer ratings of creative
designs in Study 2 and (b) relatively objective scoring criteria used
in a standard creativity task (Alternate Uses Test) in Study 3.
Finally, in Study 3, we used an analytical framework that com-
bines moderation and mediation to test the mediation hypothesis
that increased intrinsic motivation and task enjoyment mediate the
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3INSTRUMENTAL EMOTION REGULATION AND CREATIVITY
interaction effect of trait neuroticism and affective states on cre-
ative performance. In short, through these three studies, we seek to
illustrate the facilitation effects of individuals’ preferences for and
actual experiences of trait-consistent emotions on creative perfor-
mance in challenging task contexts.
Study 1
Preferences for trait-consistent emotions are more prevalent in
the pursuit of an effortful performance goal, because such situa-
tions engage effortful self-regulation of emotions to maximize task
performance (Tamir, 2005; Tamir, 2009b). Therefore, in the cur-
rent study, we led the participants to anticipate a challenging
creativity task before asking them to rate how much they preferred
recalling different types of emotional events. We predicted that
neuroticism would be related to higher preferences for recalling
worrisome as opposed to other emotion-related events.
Participants
The participants were 261 Taiwanese students (178 males, 82
females, one did not report gender; Mage  20.36, SDage  1.29)
from a public university in Tainan, Taiwan who completed the
study to receive course requirement credits.
Measures
Current emotion measure. Participants rated their current
emotions with a 5-point scale (1  not at all to 5  extremely;
adapted from Tamir, 2005; see also Larsen & Diener, 1992). The
emotions included in the scale pertain to happiness (happy, up, and
enthusiastic;   .84), worry (anxious and worried;   .81),
sadness (sad, down, and depressed;   .90), and calmness (calm,
relaxed, and pleased;   .56).
Neuroticism scale. Participants completed the 10-item neu-
roticism subscale of Goldberg’s (1992) IPIP Big Five factor mark-
ers (e.g., “I often feel blue”;   .85). They indicated how
self-descriptive each statement was on a 1 (very inaccurate) to 5
(very accurate) scale.
Preference for recalled events. Participants were presented
with a list of 12 events (Tamir, 2005), with four events in each of
the following contexts: family, friendship, and school. The four
events in each context included an event that had evoked happiness
(positive, high arousal emotion), worry (negative, high arousal
emotion), calmness (positive, low arousal emotion), or boredom
(negative, low arousal emotion). The participants rated (1  not at
all to 5  extremely) the degree to which they would like to spend
10 min recalling each of the 12 events.
Procedure
The study was conducted via an online survey. Under the cover
story that the study examined the relationship between memory
and task performance, participants first completed the current
emotion measure and the neuroticism subscale. Next, participants
were told that they would perform a demanding creativity task,
which requires them to consider and reconcile conflicting perspec-
tives to come up with creative solutions to a complex problem.
Participants were further instructed to recall a past event before
working on the creativity task. At this point, the participants rated
the degree to which they would prefer recalling each of the 12
emotional events. To check whether participants expected the
upcoming task to involve an effortful creativity goal, they rated
how (a) effortful and (b) cognitively demanding (  .79) the task
would be (1  not at all to 5  extremely). We took the average
of the two items to form an expected effort measure. As predicted,
the mean of this effort measure (M 3.71, SD 0.73) was higher
than the midpoint of the scale (i.e., the value of 3), t(258) 15.62,
p  .0001, indicating that participants expected the task to be an
effortful one.
Results
Preliminary analysis showed that the contexts of the events
(family, friendship, and school) did not qualify the effect of
neuroticism on the type of emotional events (happy, worrisome,
calm, and boring events) the participants preferred to recall, F(1,
249)  1.57, p  .21, p2  .01. Thus, we collapsed the recall
preference ratings across the three contexts to form recall prefer-
ence ratings for the four kinds of emotional events (happiness,
calmness, worry, and boredom). Next, we performed a mixed
design General Linear Model analysis on the four recall prefer-
ences, with the level of arousal (high vs. low) and valence (positive
vs. negative) of the emotional events as within-participant factors
and neuroticism (mean centered) as a continuous predictor. We
also controlled for the main and interaction effects of the four
current emotions (all mean centered) and gender in the analysis.
Two main effects were significant. Participants preferred recall-
ing positive (M  3.67, SD  0.62) versus negative events (M 
2.82, SD  0.67), F(1, 253)  307.88, p  .0001, p2  .55; and
events that induced higher (M  3.59, SD  0.65) versus lower
arousal (M  2.89, SD  0.57), F(1, 253)  272.69, p  .0001,
p2  .52. The predicted Arousal  Valence  Neuroticism
interaction was also significant, F(1, 253) 10.21, p .002, p2 
.04. To interpret this interaction, we ran separate multiple regres-
sions on the preferences for recalling happy, worrisome, calm, and
boring memories, with neuroticism as the predictor, again control-
ling for the main and interaction effects of current emotions and
gender. Supporting our hypothesis, neuroticism predicted greater
preferences for recalling worrisome memories (b  0.47, SE 
0.09, t  5.04, p  .0001), but not those for happy, calm, and
boring memories (ts  1.72, ps  .09). No effects involving
current emotions (Fs  3.70) and gender (F  0.03) were signif-
icant in these analyses.
To estimate mean levels of preference for recalling worrisome
experiences, we conducted simple regressions on the recall pref-
erence for worrisome events, with neuroticism at higher levels (1
SD above mean) and at lower levels (1 SD below mean) as
predictors. Participants higher on trait neuroticism expressed stron-
ger preferences for worrisome experiences (expected M  3.83)
than those lower on trait neuroticism (expected M  2.59). Thus,
our prediction that individuals higher in neuroticism prefer recall-
ing worrisome events than others (happy, calm, and boring events)
while anticipating a cognitively challenging creativity task was
confirmed.
Study 2
Having shown in Study 1 that individuals higher in neuroticism
have stronger preferences for experiencing worry-related events in
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4 LEUNG, LIOU, QIU, KWAN, CHIU, AND YONG
anticipation of an effortful creativity task, Study 2 (and Study 3) go
beyond examining emotion preferences in response to an antici-
pated task by (a) situationally inducing emotional experiences and
(b) testing subsequent actual performance in a creativity task.
Specifically, we manipulated participants’ emotional experiences
before having them engage in a creative idea generation task. We
predicted that the peer-rated creative performance of individuals
higher in neuroticism would benefit more from experiencing a
worrisome (vs. happy) state.
Participants
Forty Taiwanese students (19 males, 20 females, one did not
report gender; Mage  22.55, SDage  4.78) from a public univer-
sity in Tainan, Taiwan participated in a 2-day creativity workshop.
Most students in the creative industries program voluntarily par-
ticipated in the interactive workshop to learn about individual and
team creativity. They completed the study as workshop activities
on the first day.
Procedure and Materials
In the morning session of the workshop, participants completed
the same neuroticism subscale used in Study 1 (  .87) and other
individual difference assessments unrelated to the current study.
When the afternoon session began, through random assignment we
manipulated participants’ emotional experience by asking them to
recall either a happy or worrisome experience. Participants were
given 15 min to provide vivid and detailed descriptions of the
recalled experience (see Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Some sample happy recalled events are: One participant described
the fun of mango picking with friends; another participant recalled
the celebration of his or her 18th birthday with high hopes and
enthusiasm for the future. Some sample worrisome recalled events
are: One participant recalled the difficulty of making friends when
moving to a new school; another participant described his suspi-
cion of his ex-girlfriend dating his best friend. Next, they com-
pleted the 20-item PANAS (Crawford & Henry, 2004; 10 positive
emotions, e.g., “enthusiastic,”   .83 and 10 negative emotions,
e.g., “irritable,”   .89), which was used as a measure of the
extent to which they had felt positive and negative emotions at that
moment (1  not at all to 5  very much so). In particular, for
manipulation check purpose we extracted three worry-related emo-
tions from the list of negative emotions (“afraid,” “nervous,” and
“scared”;   .87) to test whether the worrisome (vs. happy) recall
condition produced more worry-related emotions.
After this, the participants completed a creativity task that
required them to generate a new design for the cabin of a com-
mercial airplane in 30 min. Upon completing their design, partic-
ipants convened in a preassigned group of three to five participants
(a total of 10 groups) and gave a 5-min presentation of their design.
Each group member then rated the design on three criteria (“it is
creative,” “it extends and breaks boundaries in design,” and “it
meets the stated goal of the design”;   .80) on a 7-point scale
(1  not at all to 7  extremely). The average composite scores
given by all members constituted our dependent measure of cre-
ativity. The task was intended to be a demanding one, given that
the participants had only 30 min to generate the design and face
peer evaluations of the design by giving an oral presentation.
Results
As a manipulation check, we performed a Recall Condition
(between-participants factor: happy vs. worrisome)  Emotion
Valence (within-participant factor: positive emotions vs. worry-
related emotions) Analysis of Variance on the average amounts of
positive and worry-related emotions reported by the participants.
The two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 38)  11.01, p 
.002, p2  .23. Participants reported more positive emotions in the
happy (M  3.11, SD  0.63) than the worrisome condition (M 
2.53, SD  0.75), F(1, 38)  7.19, p  .01, p2  .16. They also
reported more worry-related emotions in the worrisome (M 
2.27, SD 1.06) than the happy (M 1.63, SD 0.81) condition,
F(1, 38)  4.77, p  .04, p2 . 11. The recall task as a manip-
ulation of participants’ current emotional experiences was success-
ful.
To test our hypothesis, we performed analyses based on the
Social Relations Model (SOREMO; Kenny, 1994, 1998). Because
each participant was nested within a group and rated by other
group members, according to the Social Relations Model, it is
important to separate three types of effects on the ratings: (a) the
rater effect, which represents raters’ individual differences in
ratings, with some raters on average giving targets higher or lower
ratings than other raters; (b) the target effect, which represents
consistent differences in how the targets are rated, with some
targets in each group consistently being rated higher or lower than
other targets; and (c) the relationship effect, which represents the
rater by target interaction, or the unique relationship between a
given rater and a given target that has affected the ratings above
and beyond the rater and target effects. Notably, these rater, target,
and relationship effects that might emerge in a nested design are
potential confounds on the dependent variable, and statistical pro-
cedures without controlling for these confounds will be less diag-
nostic (see also Footnote 1). The SOREMO procedure takes into
account these confounding effects to ensure that the results found
are more valid.
We organized the rating data into a round-robin structure to
prepare for analysis using the SOREMO program. Specifically, we
organized the creativity scores of each group into separate matri-
ces, with each row of the matrix indicating the raters’ ratings
toward each target and the columns indicating the targets being
rated. The diagonal entries of the matrices were zero because we
did not collect participants’ self-ratings. We also entered the recall
condition, neuroticism (mean centered), and the interaction of
recall condition and neuroticism into the analysis. Because
SOREMO partitioned the variance in the creativity ratings into the
rater, target, and relationship effects, we could examine whether
the average percentage of variance of ratings attributable to each
source differed significantly from zero.
Results revealed a nonsignificant rater effect (relative vari-
ance  0.43, t  1.72, p  .12), suggesting that different raters
rated the same targets similarly. The target effect reached marginal
statistical significance (relative variance  0.18, t  1.95, p 
.08), suggesting that as expected the rated creative performance of
some targets tended to be different from that of other targets. The
relationship effect was not significant (relative variance  0.40,
t  1.37, p  .20).
More importantly, we are interested in testing whether the target
effect was associated with our variables of interest, namely, the
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5INSTRUMENTAL EMOTION REGULATION AND CREATIVITY
recall condition, individual levels of neuroticism, and their inter-
action. The SOREMO analysis revealed a significant main effect
of neuroticism (t 2.65, p .01; r .54), which as expected was
qualified by a significant interaction between recall condition and
neuroticism, t  2.09, p  .046.1 To follow up on this interaction,
Figure 1 shows the simple main effects of the recall condition on
creative performance among individuals with relatively higher
(one standard deviation above mean) and lower (one standard
deviation below mean) levels of neuroticism. Among individuals
with relatively higher levels of neuroticism, they tended to perform
more creatively after recalling a worrisome instead of a happy
event, t  1.87, p  .07. Among individuals with relatively lower
levels of neuroticism, they tended to perform less creatively after
recalling a worrisome instead of a happy event, t  1.93, p 
.06.
To summarize, the results offered preliminary support for our
prediction that individuals higher in neuroticism tended to receive
higher creativity ratings from their peers after recalling worrisome
(vs. happy) events, but the reverse was true for individuals lower
in neuroticism. By properly taking into account the rater, target,
and relationship effects important to a nested design, the findings
obtained from the SOREMO analysis confirm our prediction that
actual induction of worrisome (vs. happy) experiences creates
actual creative benefits among individuals higher in neuroticism.
Study 3
Although the findings of Study 3 generally support our conten-
tion that individuals with higher levels of trait neuroticism reap
creative benefits from experiencing worrisome (vs. happy) events,
the sample size of 40 participants was not the most ideal and the
simple main effects of emotional induction on creative perfor-
mance only reached marginal significance. Study 3 is an extension
of Study 2 in four important ways. First, in addition to manipu-
lating the recall of happy and worrisome events, we included a
neutral condition. And we had recruited a much larger sample in
Study 3. Second, recall that the creative generation task in Study 2
was a relatively demanding one, for participants had to design the
cabin of a commercial airplane within a time limit of 30 min and
later to convince other group members that the design is indeed
creative in an oral presentation. The use of a cognitively demand-
ing creativity task is in line with previous findings that the instru-
mental value of trait-consistent emotions is more prevalent in the
pursuit of an effortful performance goal, because such situations
require a higher level of emotional regulation to maximize task
performance (Tamir, 2005; Tamir, 2009b). Although results in
Study 2 are consistent with our expectation that participants higher
in neuroticism received higher creativity ratings from the evalua-
tors after recalling a worrisome (vs. happy) event, we did not
systematically vary the levels of cognitive efforts required for the
creativity task. In Study 3, we seek to provide more direct evidence
that the creative benefits of trait-consistent emotional experiences
are more likely to occur in a cognitively demanding task context.
We manipulated the participants’ cognitive load while performing
the creativity task, with half of the participants performing the task
while remembering a eight-digit number (high load condition) and
the other half performing the same task while remembering a
two-digit number (low load condition). We hypothesize that the
expected instrumental emotion regulation effect is more likely to
emerge under the high cognitive load situation.
Third, to extend the generality of Study 2’s results, we used the
Alternate Uses Test as a measure of creativity (Guilford, 1967). An
advantage of this standard creativity measure is that it uses rela-
tively objective criteria to assess both fluency (sheer number of
ideas generated) and flexibility (number of different categories that
characterize the ideas) of creative idea generation. This task nicely
complements the creative idea generation task used in Study 2,
which is a relatively more subjective task based on peer evalua-
tions.
Finally, we took a general analytical framework for combin-
ing moderation and mediation (Edwards & Lambert, 2007) to
evaluate (a) whether neuroticism moderates the relationship
between the recalled emotional states and creative performance
under cognitive load and (b) whether the moderating relation-
ship described in (a) is produced by the mediating mechanism
of intrinsic motivation.
Participants
The participants were 274 Taiwanese students (170 males, 93
females, 11 did not report gender; Mage  19.92, SDage  1.32)
from a public university in Tainan, Taiwan who completed the
study to receive course requirement credits.
Procedure and Measures
Under the cover that the study examined factors that affect
memory retention, participants first completed the neuroticism
subscale (  .84) used in Studies 1 and 2. Next, they recalled a
happy, worrisome, or neutral experience. The instructions for
recalling the happy and worrisome experiences were identical to
those used in Study 2. Following Pham (1998), we instructed the
participants in the neutral condition to write about the experiences
they usually have during a typical school day. At the end of the
1 Besides the SOREMO analysis, we also performed a regression to test
the Recall Condition  Neuroticism (mean centered) interaction on the
creativity composite score without taking into account the actor and partner
effects. The result of the two-way interaction was consistent with that
obtained from SOREMO, b0.52, SE 0.26, t1.98, p .055. No
other effects were significant, ts  1.63.
Figure 1. The effect of recall of emotional events on creativity task
performance, Study 2. The color version of this figure appears in the online
article only.
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6 LEUNG, LIOU, QIU, KWAN, CHIU, AND YONG
mood induction task, participants reported their current positive
and negative emotions on the 20-item PANAS (Crawford &
Henry, 2004;   .88 for positive emotions and .90 for negative
emotions).
Next, following Macrae et al.’s (1993), we had half of the
participants, randomly selected, study a two-digit number and the
remaining participants an eight-digit number for 25 s. They were
told that upon completion of the upcoming thinking exercise they
would be required to recall this number. The thinking exercise was
the Alternate Uses Test, which measures how well individuals can
generate a large number of ideas and devise a diverse set of
strategies of using a common object (a brick in the current study;
Guilford, 1967). As in past studies (e.g., Cheng, Leung, & Wu,
2011; Hoff & Carlsson, 2002; Leung & Chiu, 2008; Leung et al.,
2012; Lissitz & Willhoft, 1985), we instructed participants to list
as many uses for a brick as possible by not limiting themselves to
any kind of brick or to any uses they had seen or heard about
before. Upon completing the creativity task, participants wrote
down the number they recalled in the space given. Finally, by
referring to the thinking exercise they just completed, they an-
swered the four-item intrinsic motivation subscale adapted from
the Situational Motivation Scale (SIMS; Guay, Vallerand, &
Blanchard, 2000). The four items (  .95) are “I think that this
task is interesting,” “This task is fun,” “I think that this task is
pleasant,” and “I feel good when doing the task.” Participants
responded to each item using a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree).
Results
As a manipulation check, we performed an Emotion Recall
(between-participants factor: happy vs. worrisome vs. neutral) 
Emotion Valence (within-participant factor: positive vs. worry-
related emotions) repeated measures ANOVA on the average
amounts of positive and worry-related emotions reported by the
participants. As in Study 2, the worry-related emotions pertain to
“afraid,” “nervous,” and “scared” (  .83) from PANAS. The
two-way interaction was significant, F(2, 271)  4.09, p  .02,
p2  .03. Separate analyses performed on the positive and worry
related emotions revealed that participants reported more positive
emotions in the happy (M  3.20, SD  0.78) than the worrisome
(M  2.93, SD  0.78) and neutral conditions (M  3.06, SD 
0.72), F(2, 271) 2.63, p .07, p2  .02. Specifically, the extent
of positive emotions differed significantly between the happy and
worrisome recall conditions, F(1, 178)  4.96, p  .03, p2  .03.
The extent of worry-related emotions across the three recall con-
ditions differed in the expected direction though not statistically
significant (Mworrisome  1.92, SD  1.07; Mneutral  1.81, SD 
1; Mhappy  1.62, SD  0.90; F(2, 271)  1.87, p  .16, p2 
.02).2
We also conducted chi-square tests to show that the likelihood
of correctly recalling the number did not differ across recall
conditions for both high and low load conditions (percentages of
correct recall are 86%, 83.3%, and 91.7% for worrisome, neutral,
and happy conditions in the high load condition, respectively, 	2(2,
N 134) 1.25, p .54; percentages of correct recall are 92.7%,
95.6%, and 94.6% for worrisome, neutral, and happy conditions in
the low load condition, respectively, 	2(2, N  137)  .38, p 
.83), suggesting that participants in all recall conditions took the
recall task seriously.
Testing the moderating relationship between recalled emo-
tions and neuroticism on creativity. The two measures of cre-
ativity were (a) fluency, or the number of ideas generated for using
the brick; and (b) flexibility, or the number of different categories
of ideas. For the fluency measure, a judge counted the total number
of ideas the participants generated. For the flexibility measure, one
judge first reviewed all responses to come up with the coding
categories (e.g., building material, weapon, furniture) and coded
the responses accordingly. Using the same coding categories and
adding new ones if necessary, another judge independently coded
the responses (interrater agreement  84.44%). Finally, the two
judges discussed any disagreements in their codings to reach a
consensus. To test our hypothesis, we performed an Emotion
Recall (happy vs. worrisome vs. neutral)  Cognitive Demand
(low load/two-digit number vs. high load/eight-digit number) 
Neuroticism (mean centered) Analysis of Variance separately on
the two creativity measures.
None of the main or interaction effects on fluency were signif-
icant (Fs  0.95). Nevertheless, the predicted three-way interac-
tion on flexibility was significant, F(2, 262) 3.38, p .04, p2 
.03. No other effects on flexibility were significant, Fs 2.45. We
obtained the expected interaction on flexibility but not fluency,
possibly because the flexibility score (i.e., the number of diverse
categories that characterize the ideas generated) is a more sensitive
measure of creativity than the fluency score (i.e., the sheer number
of ideas generated). It is not uncommon that individuals can
manifest high fluency by generating a large number of ideas, with
the ideas themselves not being particularly unusual or creative (De
Dreu et al., 2008; Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; see also
General Discussion).
To interpret the significant interaction, we conducted separate re-
gressions for the low and high cognitive load conditions using dummy
codings for the emotion recall conditions. When cognitive load was
low, no main and interaction effects were significant (ts  0.96;
Figure 2). When cognitive load was high, the main effect of neurot-
icism was significant (b 1.48, SE 0.55, t 2.70, p .01), which
was qualified by the significant Worrisome (vs. Happy) Recall 
Neuroticism interaction (b1.65, SE 0.80, t2.08, p .04)
and the Worrisome (vs. Neutral) Recall  Neuroticism interaction
(b2.20, SE 0.76, t2.89, p .01). As shown in Figure 2,
when under high cognitive load, individuals with relatively lower
levels of neuroticism (1 SD below the mean) had higher flexibility
scores after recalling neutral (vs. worrisome) events (b 1.47, SE
0.68, t 2.16, p .03). In contrast, among individuals with relatively
higher levels of neuroticism (1 SD above the mean), there was a trend
that recalling worrisome events produced higher flexibility than did
recalling neutral events (b1.30, SE 0.68, t1.91, p .059)
and happy events (b  1.12, SE  0.72, t  1.56, p  .12).
2 When we examined all the 10 negative emotions, the difference of the
degree of negative emotions across the three recall conditions was mar-
ginally significant (Mhappy  1.88, SD  0.77; Mworrisome  2.16, SD 
0.78; Mneutral  2.02, SD  0.82; F(2, 271)  2.76, p  .07, p2  .02).
Moreover, the extent of negative emotions differed significantly between
the happy and worrisome recall conditions, F(1, 178)  5.72, p  .02,
p2  .03.
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7INSTRUMENTAL EMOTION REGULATION AND CREATIVITY
Testing intrinsic motivation as the mediator. We predicted
that under high cognitive load, intrinsic task motivation would
mediate the link between recalled emotional states and flexibility,
with the effect of recalled emotional states on intrinsic task moti-
vation moderated by the participants’ levels of neuroticism. Using
the framework outlined by Hayes (2013; SPSS macro), we tested
the first stage moderation model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; see
Figure 3) using a series of linear regressions (see Table 1). Under
the high cognitive load condition, the first regression confirms a
significant interaction between worrisome (vs. happy) recall and
levels of neuroticism, with intrinsic task motivation as the depen-
dent variable (b  0.70, SE  0.35, t  2.00, p  .048). The
interaction between worrisome (vs. neutral) recall and neuroticism
on intrinsic motivation, however, was not significant (b  0.06,
SE  0.35, t  0.16, p  .87). Follow-up analyses revealed that
trait neuroticism was positively associated with intrinsic task mo-
tivation when worrisome memories were induced (b  0.75, SE 
0.30, t  2.50, p  .02), but not when neutral (b  0.06, SE 
0.30, t  0.19, p  .85) or happy (b  0.21, SE  0.30,
t  0.71, p  .48) memories were induced. Next, the second
regression demonstrates that greater intrinsic task motivation
predicts higher flexibility (b  0.39, SE  0.17, t  2.28, p 
.02).
In contrast, under low cognitive load condition, regression anal-
yses did not show interactions between worrisome (vs. happy)
recall and neuroticism and between worrisome (vs. neutral) recall
Low Cognitive Load Condition 
High Cognitive Load Condition 
3
4
5
6
-1SD +1SD
Neuroticism
Fl
ex
ib
ilit
y Worrisome Recall
Neutral Recall
Happy Recall
3
4
5
6
-1SD +1SD
Neuroticism
Fl
ex
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ilit
y Worrisome Recall
Neutral Recall
Happy Recall
Figure 2. The effect of recall of emotional events on flexibility, Study 3. The color version of this figure
appears in the online article only.
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8 LEUNG, LIOU, QIU, KWAN, CHIU, AND YONG
and neuroticism on intrinsic motivation (t  0.79, p  .43 and
t  0.21, p  .84, respectively).
To confirm that under high cognitive load intrinsic task moti-
vation mediates the effect of worrisome (vs. happy) recall on
flexibility for individuals with higher levels of neuroticism but not
those with lower levels of neuroticism, we obtained the bootstrap
confidence intervals for this conditional indirect effect. Using a boot-
strap procedure with 1,000 bootstrap samples, the analysis yielded a
bootstrap 95% bias-corrected confidence interval [0.90, 0.01] at
higher levels of neuroticism (1 SD above the mean), suggesting that
intrinsic motivation mediated the link between worrisome (vs. happy)
recall and flexibility for individuals with higher neuroticism. When
neuroticism was at lower levels (1 SD below the mean) or at the mean
level, analyses yielded a bootstrap 95% bias-corrected intervals of
[0.14, 0.37] and [0.48, 0.03] respectively, suggesting that the
same mediation did not occur.
These results confirm that when recalling worrisome (vs. happy)
events under high cognitive load, individuals higher in trait neu-
roticism have higher levels of intrinsic motivation than their coun-
terparts lower in trait neuroticism. Higher levels of intrinsic mo-
tivation in turn predict greater flexibility in idea generations.
Taken together, the current findings provide preliminary evidence
that intrinsic motivation mediates the joint effect of worrisome (vs.
happy) emotion recall and neuroticism on flexibility when indi-
viduals need to expend greater cognitive efforts in completing the
creativity task.
General Discussion
In three studies, we have demonstrated the role of instrumental
emotion regulation in the emotions–creativity link. Individuals
higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism showed stronger preferences for
experiencing worrisome emotions in anticipation of a demanding
creativity task (Study 1). By systematically manipulating the ex-
perience of emotional states, those who actually experienced wor-
risome emotions produced creative designs that were rated as
being more creative by their peers (Study 2) and were more
cognitively flexible in generating unusual uses of a common object
under high cognitive load (Study 3). Preliminary evidence from
Study 3 also shows that increased intrinsic motivation is a medi-
ator of the creative benefits of instrumental emotion regulation.
Some limitations of the current research deserve discussion.
Recall that in Study 2 participants were asked to give an oral
presentation of their creative design so other group members could
evaluate their performance. One can reasonably argue that there is
a possibility that presentation skills of the participants may help
raise the creativity ratings. We acknowledge this possibility, but
believe that such confounding effect is minimal. First, we doubt
that good presentation skills will override the actual creativity of
the design to result in high creativity ratings. Second, three to five
evaluators rated the design, so we doubt that all the evaluators
were affected by the presentation skills without paying much
attention to the design itself. Third and more importantly, we did
not rely on only one creativity measure that is potentially con-
founded with presentation skills to draw our conclusions. We
obtained consistent results from three studies that used different
methodologies and creativity tasks. With a triangulation of designs
and measures, findings are largely supportive of our hypotheses.
Emotion Recalled: 
Worrisome (vs. happy)
 
Intrinsic Task 
Motivation 
Flexibility 
Neuroticism 
Worrisome (vs. neutral)
Figure 3. First stage moderation model with (a) intrinsic task motivation mediates the link between recalled
emotional states and flexibility and (b) neuroticism moderates the link between recalled emotional states and
intrinsic task motivation, Study 3. The color version of this figure appears in the online article only. The color
version of this figure appears in the online article only.
Table 1
Summary of Linear Regression Results, Study 3
Dependent variables
Intrinsic task motivation Flexibility
Emotion recalled
Worrisome (ref) vs. happy 0.29 (0.24) 0.06 (0.47)
Worrisome (ref) vs. neutral 0.25 (0.23) 0.11 (0.44)
Neuroticism 0.43 (0.21)
Worrisome (vs. happy) 
Neuroticism 0.70 (0.35)
Worrisome (vs. neutral) 
Neuroticism 0.06 (0.35)
Intrinsic task motivation 0.39 (0.17)
Note. The entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard
errors in parentheses.
 p  .05.
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9INSTRUMENTAL EMOTION REGULATION AND CREATIVITY
In Study 3, instrumental emotion regulation affected cognitive
flexibility, but not fluency of idea generations, possibly because
fluency, which is based on the sheer number of ideas generated, is
a less sensitive measure of creativity (DeDreu et al., 2008). Indi-
viduals can be quite fluent, but not flexible if they generate many
ideas that belong to one or a few categories. Relatedly, being more
cognitively flexible or being able to generate ideas that spread
across diverse categories (vs. simply being more fluent in gener-
ating multiple ideas) requires higher intrinsic motivation. As the
current research suggests that intrinsic motivation is one mecha-
nism underlying instrumental emotion regulation, this might ex-
plain why the predicted effect of experiencing trait-congruent
affect was observed in cognitive flexibility rather than fluency.
The present findings offer new insights into the controversy
concerning the relationship between emotional states and creativ-
ity. The emotions that benefit creativity may not be the same for all
individuals. Individuals’ choices of emotional experiences are
likely to be consistent with the experiences they typically encoun-
ter (Mayer & Stevens, 1994). As suggested by the current findings,
individuals vary in their preferences for experiencing happy or
worrisome emotions prior to performing a creativity task, partic-
ularly when it is demanding or needs to be performed under high
cognitive load. These results highlight that trait-consistent emotion
regulation enhances creative performance through its instrumental
rather than hedonic motivational properties (Tamir, Mitchell, &
Gross, 2008).
The current findings support the regulatory benefits of wor-
risome (vs. happy) emotional experiences for individuals higher
in neuroticism when they engage in a creativity task. Future
research could explore the creative benefits of instrumental
emotion regulation with other personality traits and identify the
specific kind of motivationally adaptive emotional states for a
given trait. For example, for the trait openness to experience, it
would be interesting to test whether affective states such as
inspired and carefree are instrumentally beneficial for open-
minded individuals. Such research efforts would broaden our
understanding of the pragmatic benefits of experiencing trait-
consistent affect.
Another direction for future research regarding the emotions–
creativity link pertains to studying the instrumental benefits of
emotion regulation for another important type of creativity—
insight creativity—as opposed to creative idea generation investi-
gated in the current research. Although insight creative problem-
solving, like creative idea generation, requires individuals to
overcome cognitive fixedness to generate multiple ideas, it also
requires activating the cognitive process of forging broader asso-
ciative links among given stimuli in order to arrive at the best
solution (Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, & Ormerod, 2011; Ross-
mann & Fink, 2010). The search for the best answer or the most
creative solution is likely to be an iterative process that requires
cognitive focus and persistence. Whereas Study 3 offers prelimi-
nary support that intrinsic motivation driven by task enjoyment
might account for why trait-consistent emotional experiences en-
hance creative idea generation, it is reasonable to argue that
cognitive persistence might account for why trait-consistent emo-
tional experiences enhance insight creativity. Future research can
extend the current findings to different types and domains of
creativity to better understand the operative motivational and cog-
nitive mechanisms underlying the relationship between trait-
emotion fit and creative performance, shedding further light on the
emotions–creativity link.
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